Comments on Chapters 4-5 in Zuckerman and Lichbach

Ira Katznelson sufficiently explains the purpose of his essay by claiming it is an "admiration, concern, and exhortation" of contemporary historical institutionalism. Mr. Katznelson certainly does admire the boundaries that contemporary comparativists have transcended in their studies and the way in which methodologies and paradigms have been fused together to produce better analytical studies. He also praises the new literature in comparative politics for moving beyond a battle of methodologies towards an increased effort in "identifying and probing a range of challenging issues". His praise recognizes the potential in contemporary comparative politics to utilize the newly developed pluralism in the particular field of institutional analysis. Indeed, he concludes his work by stating that no one subject can suffice, and making the striking claim that no mode of analysis can be self-sufficient.



However, Katznelson addresses his concern with the decline of large-scale work in historical institutionalism that focuses on the great moments of change in history, grand structures, and immense processes. He believes that historical institutionalism can utilize pluralist methodologies in order to bridge the gaps between these concepts that involve a large scope of both time and geographical space.

One subject which Katznelson feels historical institutionalist scholars ought to approach is the Western liberal tradition. He expresses the need for historical institutionalists to tackle large-scale historical issues like liberalism in order to use pluralist methodology to explain and analyze some of the most important social phenomena in history. He does recognize that the challenge of this massive project lies in integrating the field's methodological and causal plurality with the large-scale issue of the Western liberal tradition.

Katznelson is also concerned that historical institutionalism is decentralizing its topics and unevenly focusing on specific political regimes. He attributes this decentralization of focus to the field's widening geographic and thematic scope. He seeks to revive historical institutionalism's tradition of wide temporal scope in order to understand large institutions that have altered people's behavior for centuries.

Katznelson makes sure to reassert the continuing importance of institutionalism to studies in comparative politics. He makes sure to recognize that institutions are not "monolithic", but rather "a system of social factors that conjointly generate a regularity of behavior". He points to the incentivizing force of institutions and how institutions regulate transactional behavior. He cites Greif's claim that the "basic unit of analysis is...not the game, but the transaction".

Lichbach and Zuckerman link Katznelson's historical institutionalist analysis with that of Margaret Levi's rational choice institutionalism. Levi, however, does indeed claim a different starting point to institutionalist studies-rational choice theory. She states that the theory claims "intentional and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behavior that are often socially suboptimal and personally undesirable" at the beginning of her essay. She also, like Katznelson, recognizing that such factors including culture and ethnicity must be incorporated into rational choice accounts. Levi additionally specifies the importance of power, organizations, and, most importantly, institutions.

Levi claims that rational choice is comparatively advantageous because it is committed to its principle assumption of individual rational actors making reasoned choices. She is careful to include that these choices are quite dependent on contextual and institutional constraints. Levi, like Katznelson, acknowledges the importance of methodological pluralism in rational choice studies and its inclusion of other paradigmatic belief systems and their empirical methodologies.

Levi's most important claim in her essay deals with rationalists' abilities to transcend traditional boundaries in that field to produce better studies. She is concerned with rationalism's exclusion of the cognitive limitations of actors, the actors' ethical commitments, and collective action theory. What she does recognize is that the new generation of rationalists is self-conscious about the assumption of rationality itself. One must question whether rationality, assumed to be inherent in every decision, actually accompanies every significant instance of decision-making.

Levi also points to the importance of institutions, but does not limit herself within the bounds of Katznelson's assessment. She claims that time plays a significant role in the importance of institutions, their structure, and their ability to affect generations of individual actors' decisions. She acknowledges that rationalists must accept the significance of institutions and history. She cites Wittenberg's claim that "ideas and attitudes formed by one generation are transmitted to others over time by means of institutions and networks whose activists are working hard to ensure that they survive".

Levi also outlines the new sources, and the contemporary model, of contemporary comparative rational choice theory. She identifies the four most important sources of this new model as spatial analyses, social choice framework, collective action theory, and economic institutionalism. The keys to the contemporary model, she points out, are the assumption of rationality, the nature of the constraints on behavior, the determinants of strategic interaction, and the explanation of why and when equilibria are possible and stable and when they are not. I personally agree on the contemporary model's assumption that outcomes (fate) depend on the aggregation of individual actions. Ultimately, Levi suggests that the new model of rational choice theory, what she calls "empirical rational choice", is now one of the leading paradigms in the field of comparative politics.