Saturday, November 13, 2010

Iranian Revolution and the Battle of Ideals

I have spent a large portion of the month of October on gathering, reading, and analyzing scholarly articles on the Iranian Revolution of 1979. I have finally developed a thesis for the paper and I now feel much more comfortable when I write. I have decided to first analyze the many different socioeconomic groups that were active participants in the Iranian revolution. My thesis asserts that the revolution itself was a revolution to abolish the institution of the monarchy. However, as the revolution progressed some of the most active participants and most enthusiastic revolutionaries, the bazaaris, were forced to organize in and around mosques for security reasons. Of course, other groups like the industrial working class and white-collar state employees also mobilized but did not seek shelter in the mosques like the merchant classes. Instead, revolutionary leaders like Khomeini sought to rhetorically attack the state as both employer and repressive institution. Much of the revolutionary upsurge that came from merchant and industrial working classes was a result of the shah's economic policies that ravaged the Iranian economy in the late '70s. These groups did not demand the establishment of an Islamic republic, but an end to the economic policies that had led to economic depression and the state's repressive implementation of policy.

After the fall of the shah, Khomeini promoted the establishment of an "Islamic Republic". However, all data points to the fact that the clergy's role in Iranian society was in decline, while church attendance and donations to mosques steadily decreased during the '60s and '70s. A referendum was agreed upon to decide on the issue, and the question was asked: "Do you support abolishing the monarchy and replacing it with an Islamic Republic?" Of course, the reference to the abolition of the monarchy would have certainly motivated many to vote yes on the ballot simply because it called for the abolition of the monarchy. After the referendum was passed by a vote, Khomeini enshrined both Islamic and republican ideals in the writing of the constitution and the declaration of a new Islamic Republic. What the other major socioeconomic groups demanded during the revolution was the end to state repression and the abolition of the monarchy. Only one of those two goals would eventually be realized during and after the revolution. Many of the articles in the Iranian constitution address the limits of state power and other anti-repression rhetoric. However, most articles defining the limits of state power and the rights of the people include the final phrase "in conformity with Islamic criteria" or "except in cases sanctioned by law" or "except as provided by law". Many of the rights of the people are guaranteed only if it they do not interfere with the state's pursuit in establishing an "Islamic" republic. Since the clergy play, by far, the most significant role in the legislative and judicial process (not to mention the concept of velayat-e faqih and the Supreme Leader) it is quite easy for the new Islamic state to repress dissidents and opposition leaders.
I will assert in my paper that the revolution in 1979 was hijacked by Khomeini and the clergy. During the post-revolutionary phase, the clergy was able to demand the pursuit of Islamic ideals and allowed those ideals to trump other important revolutionary ideals such as "the end of state repression" and republicanism. In this way, the clerical regime simply replaced the monarchy with a clerical oligarchy with multiple sources of authority (temporal/spiritual). It will be the failure to realize the republican aspirations of many of the non-clerical groups that participated in the 1979 revolution that will ultimately lead to the downfall of the clerical regime in the future. The same groups Khomeini was able to unite into a broad coalition will unite against the clerical regime with almost identical objectives: to overthrow the current regime and end state repression.

1 comment:

  1. Frank, your paper seems to really be coming together and focusing in. I have two separate questions.

    1) What were the economic policies pursued by the Shah that landed him in hot water with the masses. I seem to remember that he was a sweetheart of the US at some point and I also vaguely remember the Ayatollah regime that replaced him being vaguely socialist in their ideas, at least in the beginning. It would not surprise me either way, as there was a lot of lefty arab-nationalist stuff going on at that time, Quadaffi in Libya, ect. Were the Sha's policies expanding or reducing the role of the state in the economy and what did the Khomeini regime do to change that.

    Secondly, you imply that the end of the Iranian state is coming soon and I'm wondering what is leading you to that conclusion. This regime has been in power for over 30 years, and although the elections for Akhmedinejad last summer certainly led to some turmoil in the capital, the state seemed more than apt to repress the movements (shutting down the internet, communication, and arresting hundreds of protesters involved.) Furthermore, I recently saw a documentary on HBO 'Letters to the President' about Ahmedinejad's popularity within Iran and other parts of the Arab world. Where will the downfall of the regime come from? The Iranian masses? The gov-clerical divide? Outside forces, US?

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