Although the protests in Yemen have generally been affiliated with those non-violent protests in Tunisia and Yemen, because of the complexities of socio-religio-political groups, there has been an explosion of violence throughout the republic. Armed military units, tribal forces, and other militants have eliminated the change of any revolution being a peaceful one. Because of this widespread violence, the prospects o the conflict in Yemen leading to a Somali-style anarchy is being considered over the idea of Yemen becoming a democratic republic of sorts.
Fattah immediately provides a bleak picture of the socio-economic climate of Yemen, and the figures are quite daunting: 24 million people spread over 135,000 villages, 75% of Yemenis living in rural villages with 15% of those villages having no electricity, 40% unemployment and 43% of a rapidly growing population living below the poverty line. This paints a picture tremendously more dire than Egypt or Tunisia. In 2003 75 percent of the government’s revenue came from 450,000 barrels of oil per day; by 2009, this fell to 180,000 barrels per day. With these statistics, Fattah demonstrates that Saleh’s regime is clearly one struggling to survive, and the president has continued to manipulate any and all regional or international issue from the War on terror to the Sunni-Shia “cold war”.
Three groups were identified by Fattah as the central players in the protests. The first was the large peaceful youth movements I indicated earlier. The second is the tribal group headed by the al-Ahmar family which is the most influential as far as military and financial means are concerned. The third is made up of formal oppositional parties, which is generally the weakest. However, in Yemen, unlike Egypt, they were formulated and made their demands known right away as protests began, as opposed to the Egyptians, which occurred after the protests were successful. This only adds to the complexity of thepolitical arena in Yemen.
There is no single individual, group, or institution, for that matter that can take over if Saleh steps down or is forced down. Yemen provides an excellent example of a revolution in a fragile state, where a variety of groups can fill the power vacuum and potentially create a Yemen that would resemble more of a Somalia than even an Egypt, and certainly not a Tunisia. Fattah concludes by claiming that major political changes in Yemen are closely fused with political changes in Saudi Arabia.
Fattah, Khaled. "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheikhs." 2011.Middle East Policy 18 (3): 79-85.
Interesting... any insight on Saleh's most recent deal?
ReplyDeletehttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/middleeast/saleh-returns-to-yemen-as-date-is-set-for-elections.html?ref=middleeast
I am just curious about what it would mean for the future of Yemen if any the three different groups that you identified are able to fill the power vacuum. Which of the three would provide the most agreeable outcome and which one would lead to a Somali-style state?
ReplyDelete